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Annotated translation of the chapter on the Yogācāra of the *Blo gsal grub mtha'**

— Part One —

Katsumi MIMAKI

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* The present translation is one of the results of the research which I accomplished at the “Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens” of Hamburg University from October 1985 to March 1987 as a research-fellow of the Humboldt Foundation (“Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung”). Here I would like to thank the foundation for having provided me with the ideal conditions for research during this period. I would also like to express my profound gratitude to Lambert Schmithausen, my host-professor, and to David Seyfort Ruegg, both of whom organized a collective seminar during my stay at Hamburg, and rendered their assistance not only in technical matters, but also as friends and colleagues. I would like to thank also Félix Erb and Burkhard Quessel for their useful suggestions and remarks in the seminar. My thanks go equally to David Jackson, Robert Kritzer and Wendi Adamek who, taking the trouble to read through my final English version, have filled my lacunae in a language which is not my own. If there is any merit in my present work, it is thanks to those I have just mentioned; but if there are errors, needless to say I am alone responsible.

** The Tibetan text is critically edited in Mimaki (1982) 95–137, and a synopsis was already provided there. But as the result of a more careful reading of the text, I present here a revised synopsis with slight emendations in detail. About the importance of the present document, the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, see Mimaki (1982) 1–54.

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Translation***

[1. Teachings of definitive and provisional meaning, according to the Yogācāra school]

[1.1. The teaching of definitive meaning : mind only]

[82 b 2] Now [here is] the explanation of the doctrinal position

*** In the present annotated translation the philological information, which was already given in the notes of the Tibetan edition (Mimaki (1982) 95–137), will generally not be repeated. ↗

of the Vijñānavādin of the Great Vehicle¹⁾: [the Buddha] proclaimed [the theory of] mind only (*sems tsam, citta-mātra*) as [the teaching of] definitive meaning (*ñes don, nītārtha*).

The Muni (*thub pa*) proclaimed as [the teaching of] definitive meaning that all things are nothing but representation (*rnam rig tsam, vijñapti-mātra*). (k° XI-1 ab)

As the Blessed One said in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*:

[Errata and Corrigenda for Mimaki (1982) 95 – 137]			
page. line	Read	Instead of	
95.13	dañ	du	(against xyl.)
—, 17	11	10	
98.2	snod	sond	
—, 23	tad-vineya	tad vineya	
99.17	Delete “1 de BSGT, du MSA.”		
—, 25	med (P. mi) 'dod	med 'dod	
100.26	Insert “21 pa'i phyir BSGT, phyir yañ MSam.”		
104.1	Line up with the next line.		
105.3	lñar	sñar	(against xyl.)
107.12	gyi	kyi	(against xyl.)
—, 23 (n. 320)	srotasāugha-	srotas-augha-	
—, 24	arhattve	arhatve	
114.1	Insert “gzugs dañ” between “ni” and “sems”. (against xyl.)		
117.30 (n. 340)	yathā-nāma...	yathā nāma...	
—, 31 (n. 340)	asatkālpa-	asamkalpa-	
119.22	2	3	
124.7	dge	dag	
—, 21	Insert “7 bsam mi khyab dañ dge dañ brtan Trés, bsam gyi mi khyab dag dañ bstan BSGT.”		
—, 27 (n. 360)	yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ	yadā lambanaṃ vijñānaṃ	
125.33 (n. 364)	se retrouve	est retrouvé	
127.21	'byin	'phyin	
131.25	ltar	ltas	
—, 25	CD	Cd	
132.13	rtog	gtogs	
135.20	Insert line number 20 in the margin.		
136.7	Insert “//” after “yin no”		

- 1) In this chapter the particle *las* is used in this place, whereas in the Mādhyamika chapter the particle *la* is used: *da ni theg pa chen po dBu ma pa'i grub pa'i mtha' bśad pa la chos thams cad bden pa gñis su gsuñs pa* (BSGT 96 a 6, Mimaki (1982) 138).

“O, Victor’s sons (*rgyal ba’i sras, jina-putra*), these three realms (*kham s gsum pa, traidhātuka*) are nothing but mind.”

[It is] also [said] in the *Laṅkāvatāra* [–*sūtra*]²⁾:

“The individual (*gaṇ zag, pudgala*), the flow [of consciousness] (*rgyun, saṃtati*)³⁾, the aggregates (*phuṇ po, skandha*), the conditions (*rkyen, pratyaya*), as well as the atoms (*rdul, aṇu*), primary matter (*gtso bo, pradhāna*), the Lord (*dBaṇ phyug, Īśvara*) and the agent (*byed po, karṭṛ*)⁴⁾ are constructed only in the mind⁵⁾.”

- 2) A comparison of variants indicates clearly that our author did not cite this *Sūtra* from the original *Sūtra* itself, but from a treatise which cites this *Sūtra*. This is also the case for the *Daśabhūmika* quotation cited immediately before. Concerning these three verses of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, as indicated in notes (292)–(294) of Mimaki (1982; 96), the first two and the last two of these three verses are cited respectively in the *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti* (Abbr. *MAV*) of Śāntarakṣita and in the *Madhyamakāloka* (Abbr. *MĀl*) of Kamalaśīla, and it is very possible that our author, dBu pa blo gsal, cited these verses from these two treatises (more probably the first verse from the *MAV* and the last two verses from the *MĀl*), even if there are nevertheless slight differences between the variants in detail. Here is the Tibetan text of the *Laṅk* in these two treatises (italicized words indicate variant readings): –*MAV* (ed. Ichigō: (1985 a) p. 126): *gaṇ zag rgyun daṇ phuṇ po daṇ // rkyen daṇ de bzin rdul rnam daṇ // gtso bo dbaṇ phyug byed pa dag // sems tsam po las rnam par brtags // don yod ma yin sems ñid de // phyi rol don mthoṇ log pa yin // rigs pas rnam par bltas na ni // gzuṇ daṇ ’dzin pa ’gag par ’gyur //*; –*MĀl* (P. 157 a 5–6, D. 145 b 1): *don yod ma yin sems ñid de // phyi rol don mthoṇ log pa yin // rigs pas rnam par lta rnam kyī // gzuṇ daṇ ’dzin pa ’gag par ’gyur // ji ltar byis pas^[1] rnam brtags ltar // phyi rol don ni yod ma yin // bag chags kyis^[2] ni bsgribs pa’i sems // don du snaṇ ba rab tu ’byuṇ //* (^[1]pas D, pa P; ^[2]kyis D, gyis P). On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that the last verse is cited in the *Tattvaratnāvalī* of Advayaavajra (11 th c.) in support of the opinion of the Nirākāravadin (cf. Shastri (1927) 18.12–13, Ui (1952) 4.8–9, Ui (1963) 5.7–8); and the Tibetan version of it is perfectly identical with our text here (cf. Mimaki (1986) 10.17–20). The new critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Tattvaratnāvalī* has been prepared by the present translator and is forthcoming.
- 3) The original reading of BSGT “rgyun du” should be regarded as an error for “rgyun daṇ”, as indicated by the Tibetan versions of the verse of the *Laṅk* and its citation. Probably the *rjes ’jug* “ñ” of “daṇ” was written at the foot of the character “da”, like a *wa zur*, and a copyist mistook it for a *žabs kyu*.
- 4) Whether this is to be understood as “the Lord and the agent” (Izumi (1927) 46 & 161, Suzuki (1932) 70, and Yasui (1976) 71 & 253) or “the Lord who is the agent” (Ichigō: (1985 a) 145) is difficult to decide from the verse itself, but I took it in the former sense, according to the prose passage preceding this verse in the *Laṅk*. There the difference between the *tathāgatagarbha* theory and the *tīrthika*’s *ātmavāda* is explained, and *karṭṛ* is used in the sense of *ātman*: cf. *Laṅk* 33.15: *tīrthakarā api bhagavan nityaḥ kartā nirguṇo vibhur avyaya ity ātmavādōpadeśaṃ kurvanti //* (“Oh Blessed One! the non-Buddhists maintain the theory of *ātman* that the permanent agent is...”).
- 5) (Tib.) *sems tsam po las* / (Skt.) *citta-mātre*; cf. *sems tsam po la* (reading of Peking edition of the verse of the *Laṅk* cited in the *MAV*, ed. Ichigō: (1985 a) 126, n. 2).

“The object does not exist, but only the mind. The sight of an external object is erroneous. For those who see with logical rigour, [the duality of] object and subject ceases.”

“The external object does not exist as ordinary people (*byis pa, bāla*) construct [it]. The mind, which is agitated by impregnation (*bag chags, vāsanā*), appears as if it were an [external] object.”

It is said also in the *Upālīparipṛcchā*⁶⁾:

“There is no executioner (*gnod par byed pa, kāraṇā-kāraka*)⁷⁾ who wields the sword (*ral gri, asi*), the lance (*mda' chen, tomara*) and the dagger (*mtshon, śastra*). But by force of [mental] construc-

6) Cf. n. 295 of Mimaki (1982) 97. The *Upālīparipṛcchā* corresponds to the twenty-fourth assembly, “Assembly with Upālī” (優波離會) of the *Mahāratnakūṭasūtra* (T. [11] (310) 514 b 8–519 b 16), the Sanskrit text of which is known to us only from Sanskrit fragments and many citations. The Sanskrit fragment was first edited by N. Dutt in *The Indian Historical Quarterly* (VII, 2, 1931, pp. 259–286) and was more completely edited by P. Python (1973), with the help of two Tibetan versions (Peking and sNar than) and four Chinese ones. Among the Chinese versions, T. [11] (310) 514 b 8–519 b 16 and T. [12] (325) 37 b 1–42 c 10 are complete, whereas T. [12] (326) 42 c 11–43 b 6 and T. [30] (1582) 960 c 1–962 b 16 are either partial, or free translations. The location of the *Upālīparipṛcchā* in the Tibetan *bKa' 'gyur* is: C. (1029 (24)) *ca* 132 b 1–151 a 5, sDe sge (68) *ca* 115 a 1–131 a 7, lHa sa (68) *ca* 222 a 2–246 a 2, N. (56) *ca* 220 a 1–244 a 2, and P. [24] (760 (24)) *zi* 111 a 3–129 a 8.

The *Upālīparipṛcchā* is cited in texts of a later period, such as the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, the *Prasannapadā*, etc. The two verses cited here in BSGT are cited in the *Prasannapadā* (ed. La Vallée Poussin, 53.9–54.2, 191.4–7) in the following form. The readings different from Python's edition are indicated in italics:

na ca *kāraku kāraṇa* santi yehi kṛtā asi-tomara-śastrāḥ /
kalpa-vaśena tu paśyati tatra kāyī patanti *apāyita* śastrāḥ //
citra-manorama-sajjita-puṣpāḥ svarṇa-vimāna jalanti manojñāḥ /
teṣv api *kāraku* nāst'iha kaści te 'pi ca sthāpita kalpa-vaśena //

The present translation is in principle based on the Tibetan version of the BSGT. The important variant readings are indicated in the following notes.

7) The reading of the Sanskrit manuscript is *kāraka-kāraṇa* (agent and cause); that of the *Prasannapadā* (*kāraku kāraṇa*) can be understood in the same sense. Python, based on Mvyut 3837 (*kāraṇā-kārakaḥ* / *gnod byed* / [漢] 作害), proposed a correction of the text to *kāraṇa-kāraka*, which corresponds well with the Tibetan version.

tion (*rtog pa, kalpa*) one sees in the evil realms (*ñan soñ, apāya*)⁸⁾ [the dagger] falling on [his] body. There is [however in reality] no dagger⁹⁾ there.”

“The multicoloured and pleasant flowers bloom and the golden pavilions shine in a lovely way. In this [world] for these [things] there is no agent: these [things] are fixed by force of the [mental] construction.”

[83 a 1] Thus, this [teaching of] representation only (*rnam par rig pa tsam, vijñapti-mātra*), without duality of object and subject (*gzun ba dan 'dzin pa gñis su med pa, grāhya-grāhakādvaya*) and void of the Self and things (*bdag dan chos kyis ston pa, ātma-dharma-sūnya*), is the intended [meaning] (*dgonis pa, abhiprāya*) of all the extremely profound teachings of the Buddha. Therefore all the Sacred Writings (*gsun rab, pravacana*) which teach in that way are of definitive meaning (*ñes pa'i don, nītārtha*).

[1.2. The teaching of provisional meaning: the existence of visible matter, etc., and the absence of self-nature]

[83 a 2] [Objection:] Why then did [the Buddha] teach for example that visible matter (*gzugs, rūpa*) and other [objects] exist, or that all things are without self-nature (*ño bo ñid med pa, niḥsvabhāva*)?

8) *Apāyi* is loc. sg. of *apāya*, a synonym of *durgati* (cf. Edgerton BHSD 46); *ta* is nom. pl. of the demonstrative. In the verse cited in the *PrasP*, we find the form *apāyita*, which May (1959; 156) translates as “celui qui est jeté en enfer”, considering it as the subject of the verb *paśyati*. The Tibetan version is rather near the reading of the *UP* as edited by Python. There are, nevertheless, several obscure points concerning this verse. For example, is *de dag* of *ñan soñ de dag na* the translation of *ta*? See also the next note.

9) *UP ta śāstrāḥ*. Did the Tibetan translator see *na śāstrāḥ* to translate it as *mtshon cha med*?

[Answer:] The teachings that [things] exist or that [they] do not exist, are held [by the Yogācāra] to be of provisional meaning. (k° XI-1 cd)

[1.2.1. The existence of visible matter, etc., as a teaching of provisional meaning]

[83 a 2] Further, [the Buddha's] proclamation in the Scripture (*mdo, sūtra*) that the sense-fields (*skye mched, āyatana*) such as visible matter (*gzugs, rūpa*) exist, was stated with a special intention with regard to people who are to be trained by that [proclamation] (*des 'dul ba'i skye bo, tad-vineya-jana*). As it is said in the *Vimśatikā* (k° 9 and 8) [of Vasubandhu]:

“From its own seed a representation appears having [a certain] image (*snañ ba, ābhāsa*). The Muni proclaimed them (seed and image)¹⁰⁾ as the two-fold sense-fields of the [representation].”

“If the existence of the sense-fields such as visible matter has been proclaimed, this is with a special intention with regard to (*dgoñs pa'i dbaṅ gis, abhiprāya-vaśāt*) people to be trained (*'dul ba yi skye bo, vineya-jana*) by this [proclamation]: just as in the case of spontaneously produced beings (*brdzus te byuñ ba'i sems can, upapāduka-sattva*)¹¹⁾.”

10) Cf. Vinītadeva's commentary to the *Vimśatikā*, P. [113] (5566) si 216 a 2-3 : ... *rañ gi sa bon gañ las mig gi rnam par śes pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byuñ ba dan snañ ba 'byuñ ba gañ yin pa sa bon dan snañ ba de dag ni rnam par rig pa de'i nañ dan phyi'i skye mched du bcom ldan 'das kyis gsuñs so...*

11) The intention of this metaphor seems to be the following: The spontaneously produced beings are those who are born spontaneously by virtue of their acts, without depending on anything such as womb, egg, etc. The Buddhist tradition counts inhabitants of heavens (*deva*), those of hells (*nāraka*) and the Intermediate State (*antarābhava*) as spontaneously produced beings. Cf. AK III 9 b-c: *nārakā upadādukāḥ / antarābhava-devāś ca*; (Tib.) P. [115] 5591 gu 133 b 7 : *dmyal ba rnams dan lha rnams dan // srid pa bar ma brdzus te skye //* The existence of the Intermediate State, for example, is proclaimed by the Muni in order to console ordinary people who are afraid of knowing that there is nothing after death. In the same way the two-fold sense-fields are proclaimed by virtue of intention with respect to people who are afraid of knowing that there is nothing in the external world.

[1.2.2. The absence of self-nature as a teaching of provisional meaning]

[83 a 4] In the same way, [the teaching of] the absence of self-nature for all things and other [teachings] which the Blessed One proclaimed in the Extremely Vast Basket (*śin tu rgyas pa'i sde snod, vaipulya-piṭaka*)¹²⁾ were also proclaimed through a special intention. As it is said at great length in the *Samdhinirmocana* [-sūtra]¹³⁾ :

“Listen! I shall explain to you the intended meaning of the teaching that all things are without self-nature, without production, without destruction, calm from the beginning and naturally extinguished. Paramārthasamudgata! You should know the following. I taught that all things are without self-nature, having in mind three absences of self-nature (*ño bo ñid med pa, niḥsvabhāvatā*)¹⁴⁾ : namely, the absence of self-nature as to characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa, lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*), the absence of self-nature as to birth (*skye ba ño bo ñid med pa, utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*) and the absence of self-nature as to ultimate reality (*don dam pa ño bo ñid med pa, paramārtha-*

12) “*Śin tu rgyas pa'i sde snod*” (*vaipulyapiṭaka*) means the Mahāyāna Sūtras, particularly the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*. Cf. Lamotte (1935) 193 n. 2 ; Mimaki (1982) 234 n. 588. See also — AS 84.11 : *yad uktam vaipulye niḥsvabhāvēḥ sarvadharmā iti / tatra ko 'bhisandhiḥ* // [(Tib.) P. [102] (5550) li 124 b 2, D. (4049) ri 105 a 2] *śin tu rgyas pa las chos thams cad ño bo ñid med do źes gaṇ gsuṇs pa de la dgoṇs pa gaṇ yin źe na /* ; — id. 83.14 : *kena kāraṇena vaipulyaṃ bodhisattvānāṃ Pāramitā-piṭakam ucyate* / [(Tib.) P. 123 b 6–7, D. 104 a 7–b 1] *ci'i phyir śin tu rgyas pa la byaṇ chub sems dpa'i Pha rol tu phyin pa'i sde snod ces bya źe na /* ; — id. 83.19 : *kena kāraṇena vaipulyaṃ* (sic) *audāryaṃ gāmbhīryaṃ ca deśyate* / ... [(Tib.) P. 124 a 1, D. 104 b 2] *ci'i phyir śin tu rgyas pa la rgya che ba daṇ / zab par bstan ce na /* ...

13) Through a comparison of the Tibetan texts, it is clear that dBus pa blo gsal did not cite the passage directly from the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* itself. Identification of the source from which he cites it must await further research.

14) Cf. TrsBh 41.7–8 (ad Trs k°23) : ... *trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā ca* / (Tib.) ... *ño bo ñid med pa rnam pa gsum ni mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa daṇ / skye ba ño bo ñid med pa daṇ / don dam pa ño bo ñid med pa'o /*.

niḥsvabhāvatā) . . . ”

[83 b 1] That is exactly why the venerable (*śal śna nas* or *śal śna na*)¹⁵⁾ Maitreya-nātha says [in his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (XI k°52¹⁶⁾ & 50)] :

“Concerning the beginning [of the round of existences],¹⁷⁾ identity,¹⁸⁾ otherness,¹⁹⁾ the particular character (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*, *svalakṣaṇa* : viz. *parikalpita-svabhāva*),²⁰⁾ itself (*rañ*, *svayam*, viz. *paratantra-svabhāva*),²¹⁾ change (*gžan du 'gyur*, *antyathābhāva*, viz. *pariniṣpanna-*

15) *Śal śna nas* is known to be a honorific title; cf. — Laufer (1914) 1135; — Bacot (1954) 313 n. 4; — Hadano (1966) 46; — De Jong (1972) 510–511, 558 n. 23. It is the equivalent of *pāda*, an honorific Sanskrit term used in the plural; cf. PrasP 359.7 = (Tib.) P. [98] (5260) 'a 133 a 7. But the process of the formation of this term is still to be investigated. In the Tibetan expression “someone says . . .”, the subject is normally expressed by the instrumental case, as for example in BSGT 83 b 3–4 (*dByig gñen gyis . . . źes gsuñs pa*). Thus, here in the expression, “the venerable Maitreya-nātha says . . .” (*mGon po Byams pa'i śal śna nas . . . ces gsuñs pa*), it is possible to think that *śal śna nas* is *śal śna na*, plus the instrumental affix -s; that is to say, the original form of this honorific term is *śal śna na*, and not *śal śna nas*. However, more frequently *śal śna nas* is considered to be one word; cf. — the title of the eighth chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (*slob dpon gyi śal śna nas kyi che ba brjod pa'i skabs*); — Fukuda & Ishihama (1986) 191 (*dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po'i śal śna nas kyi rnam par thar pa . . .*). It is sometimes written *śal mña' nas*; cf. *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, P. [95] (5254) *tsha* 327 b 1. It is reported that it is also written *śa śna nas* (as well as in corrupt forms, such as *śa śnar nas* or *śa bsnar nas*) in letter-documents found in Tun-huang; cf. Takeuchi (1986) 567–568.

16) The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XI k°52 is famous for demonstrating the intellectual receptivity to the truth that states of existence have no origination (*anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*), and eight kinds of *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti* are explained.

17) Cf. MSABh 68.7–8 : *ādau saṃsārasya na hi tasyādy-utpattir asti* /.

18) Cf. MSABh 68.8–9 : *tattve 'nyatve ca pūrva-pāścimānām na hi saṃsāre teṣām eva dharmānām utpattir ye pūrvam utpannās tad-bhāvenānutpatteḥ* /. In Lévi's translation (1911; 124 : . . . dans la Transmigration, il n'y a pas Production d'Idéaux qui n'aient pas été produits antérieurement) and in Thurman's (1979; 141 : . . . in cyclic life there is no production of phenomena which have *not* been produced before), it seems that the negative, here shown in italics, is incorrect.

19) Cf. MSABh 68.9 : *na cānyeṣām apūrva-prakārānutpatteḥ* /.

20) Cf. MSABh 68.10 : *svalakṣaṇe parikalpitasya svabhāvasya na hi tasya kadācid utpattiḥ* /.

21) Cf. MSABh 68.10–11 : *svayam anutpattau paratantrasya* /.

svabhāva),²²⁾ defilement²³⁾ and purification,²⁴⁾ the intellectual receptivity (*bzod pa, kṣānti*) to the [truth that] states of existence have no origination is stated.”

And also,

“Because [things] do not exist of themselves, [do not exist] by [their] self-nature, do not endure in [their] self-nature²⁵⁾ and self-nature does not exist as apprehended, one admits that the absence of self-nature [of all things] is taught.”

The master Vasubandhu too says in the *Trimśikā*²⁶⁾ (k°23) :

“Having in mind the three absences of self-nature of three natures, [He] taught the absence of self-nature of all things.”

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- 22) Cf. MSABh 68.11 – 12 : *anyathābhāve pariniṣpannasya na hi tad-anyathābhāvasy-otpattir asti* /.
- 23) Cf. MSABh 68.12 : *saṃkleśe prahīṇe na hi kṣaya-jñāna-lābhinah saṃkleśasyōtpattim punah paśyanti* /.
- 24) MSA has here “*khyad par la*” (*viśeṣe*) instead of the “*nam byañ la*” (*vyavadāne*) of our text. This means, according to the MSA, that there is no origination of distinction for the Buddhas who have the *dharma* for a body. dBus pa blo gsal did not cite this verse of MSA correctly, probably because he confused the phrases in his memory, being too much influenced by a certain set of terminology : *kun nas ñon moṅs pa* (*saṃkleśa*) / *nam byañ* (*vyavadāna*). Cf. MSABh 68.13 : *viśeṣe buddha-dharmakāyā-nām na hi teṣām viśeṣōtpattir asti* / (Tib.) P. [108] (5527) *phi* 188 a 5 : *khyad par ni saṅs rgyas kyi chos kyi sku rnams la ste / de dag la ni khyad par du skye ba med do* //. Concerning the interpretation of the term *dharmakāya*, see Paul Harrison, “Is the Dharma-kāya the Real “Phantom Body” of the Buddha?,” article to be published in *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 15, 1, 1992.
- 25) In the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and the MSA k°52 cited just above, and also in the *Trś* k°23 cited soon after, it is a question of the three *niḥsvabhāvatā* of *trisvabhāva*, viz. *parikalpita*-, *paratantra*- and *pariniṣpanna*-*svabhāva*. But here in this verse (MSA k°50) it is a question of the three *niḥsvabhāvatā* of the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa-traya*) of conditioned things (*samskṛta*), viz. production (*utpāda*), duration (*sthiti*) and destruction (*bhaṅga*). Cf. — MSABh 67.20–21 : ... *ity etat trividham niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa-trayānugam veditavyam* / ; — MSA-Vṛttibhāṣya of Sthiramati (ed. Hayashima (1979) 39.27–28 : *de ltar skye ba rañ bžin med pa dañ / žig pa rañ bžin med pa dañ / gnas pa rañ bžin med pa dañ* / ... It is not clear, however, if dBus pa blo gsal was conscious of this difference in citing this verse (k°50) from the MSA.
- 26) To briefly note the new publication of the Sanskrit manuscripts (facsimile edition) of three works of Vasubandhu including the *Trś* : K. Mimaki, M. Tachikawa and Y. Yuyama (ed.), *Three works of Vasubandhu in Sanskrit Manuscript*, the *Tri-svabhāvanirdeśa*, the *Vimśatikā* with its *Vṛtti*, and the *Trimśikā* with Sthiramati's Commentary, Bibliotheca Codicum Asiaticorum 1, the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989.

[2. The divisions of the Yogācāra]

[2.1. The main divisions: the *Satyākāravādin (rNam bden pa) and the *Alīkāravādin (rNam rdzun pa)]²⁷⁾

[83 b 4] [Here is] an explanation of how [the Yogācāra] ex-

- 27) If we present in the form of a table the classification of the Yogācāra school which follows in our text, we have:

—	rNam bden pa
—	sNa tshogs gñis med [pa] Śāṅkaranandana, Prajñākaragupta
—	Grañs bzin [pa] Śākyabuddhi
—	Śes dañ rnam pa phyed mar smra [ba]
—	rNam rdzun pa
—	Dri bcas pa Vinītadeva
—	Dri ma med pa Dharmottara

Concerning this classification of dBus pa blo gsal, we can make at least the following three remarks:

First of all, the famous classification of the Yogācāra school into the Luñ gi rjes 'brañ (*Āgamānusārin, followers of the *Āgama*, viz. the *Yogācārabhūmi*) and the Rigs pa'i rjes 'brañ (*Nyāyānusārin, followers of the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti), a classification which Obermiller (1931; 99) introduced to us, is not found. Unfortunately, Obermiller does not seem to give the source for his description. It seems that we do not find this classification yet in the writings of Tsoñ kha pa. The Second Dalai Lama, dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1475–1542), mentions it in his *GTD2* (cf. Mimaki [1983] 49.24–26), whereas it does not appear in his contemporaries' works, such as the *JTGT* of Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1546) or the *PSGT* of Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478–1554). So we might conclude as a working hypothesis that this classification began to be used rather late, namely around the fifteenth century.

The second point that we can make concerning the classification of dBus pa blo gsal is that he uses the terms, rNam bden pa and rNam rdzun pa, to indicate the two branches of the Yogācāra-vijñānavādin, as do the Tibetan writers usually. In fact, it was generally thought that the Tibetans prefer to use these terms, whereas the Indian authors use the terms rNam pa dañ bcas par smra ba (Sākāravādin) and rNam pa med par smra ba (Nirākāravāda). See, for example, JSSN 202.2–3 : 'dir rNal 'byor spyod pa ni rnam pa gñis te / rNam pa dañ bcas pa dañ / rNam pa med pa'o // ; TRat 1.15–16 : *Yogācāraś ca dvividhaḥ sākāra-nirākāra-bhedena* / (Tib.) 2.4–5 : *rNal 'byor spyod pa la yañ rnam pa gñis te / rNam pa dañ bcas pa dañ / rNam pa med pa'i dbye bas so* //. But I can now say that not only the terms, rNam bden pa and rNam rdzun pa, but also terms indicating the sub-schools of the rNam rdzun pa, viz. the Dri bcas pa and the Dri ma med pa, can be found in an Indian text. The text in question is a short doxographical text, namely the *Sarvayānālokaviśeṣa-bhāṣya* or *Sarvayānālo-kakara-vaibhāṣya-nāma* (P. [102] (5303) *ha* 415 a 1–425 a 6 ; D. (3907) *a* 306 a 4–313 a 7) of Subhūtiḥoṣa (Rab 'byor dbyaṅs) ; cf. P. 420 b 7–421 a 1 : *rNam brdzun pa la yañ gñis su 'dod // Dag pa dañ ni dri mar byas // rNam brdzun dag pa ni rnam pa dkar dmar la sogs pa 'di sañs rgyas pa'i gnas skabs na med la / ma dag pa la snañ ño zes zer ba'o // Dri ma dañ bcas pa ni rnam pa'i 'khor lo 'di sañs rgyas pa'i dus na yañ yod la / 'khrul par śes pas phyin ci log dañ ldan pa'i ñes pa'añ med do zes pa mjug bsodus pa'o //* "One accepts that there are two [sub-schools] in the rNam brdzun pa, viz. the 'Pure' and the 'Impurity [Possessing]'. The 'Pure' [school] of the rNam brdzun pa maintains that these images, such as white and red etc., do not exist in the state of being Buddha, but appear for those who are not [yet] pure [viz. who have not yet reached the Buddha stage]. The 'Impurity Possessing' [school] says that this ↗

pounds the definitive meaning (*ñes don, nītārtha*).

Concerning the method of maintaining this Path of the Great

↘ circle of images exists even at the time of being Buddha, but since he knows that it is false, he does not have the fault of possessing a delusion. Thus is the conclusion." The rNam rdzun dag pa corresponds to the Dri ma med pa, and the Dri ma dañ bcas pa to the Dri bcas pa of BSGT. Thus, the ideas of the two sub-schools of the rNam rdzun pa are clearly mentioned in this text, even though, unfortunately, no proper name of the advocates of these sub-schools is indicated.

The third point that we can make is that, in the classification of dBus pa blo gsal, the names indicating the three sub-schools of the rNam bden pa show a transitional step before reaching the fixed form which we can find in the doxographical texts of a later period, such as the *GTCM* or the *CKGT*. Here are the sub-schools of the Yogācāra-vijñānavādin in form of a table as they are found in *GTCM* ña 6 b 1 – 7 a 1, 68 a 1 ff., *CKGT* 207.16 ff., 211.19 ff.; see also Hakamaya (1976):

rNam bden pa	[CKGT] Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi
└ sNa tshogs gñis med pa	[GTCM] Dharmakīrti
└ gZuñ 'dzin grañs mñam pa . . .	[GTCM] Śākyabuddhi
└ sGo ña phyed tshal pa	[GTCM] Śāṅkaranandana
rNam rdzun pa	
└ Dri bcas pa	[GTCM, CKGT] Dharmottara
└ Dri med pa	[GTCM, CKGT] Prajñākaragupta

As a comparison of the two tables clearly shows, the terms naming the two sub-schools of the rNam rdzun pa are almost the same in BSGT and *GTCM/CKGT*. On the other hand, those for the three sub-schools of the rNam bden pa, except for the sNa tshogs gñis med pa, differ considerably, even though the contents of the philosophical ideas expressed by these three sub-schools are the same. We find the same situation in the *gZuñ lugs legs par bśad pa* (*gSuñ 'bum*, vol. 5, 141 b 6 ff.) of Sa skya pañḍita (1182–1251); the ideas are already expressed, but the terminology differs; the terms indicating the three sub-schools are "gñis med du smra ba," "rNam pa'i grañs ji sñed par śes pa'i grañs kyañ de sñed du 'dod pa," and "rNam par śes pa sgo ña bkas pa ltar 'dod pa." All this means that the names of these three sub-schools were still not yet fixed in the period of dBus pa blo gsal, viz. the mid-fourteenth century. sTag tshan lo tsa ba Śes rab rin chen (1405–?) says in his *grub mtha'* that the division of the rNam bden pa into these three sub-schools was made by *Bod sñia ma dag* (earlier Tibetans), and he uses these three names in their fixed form; cf. TTGTRG 68 b 6 – 69 a 2 : *Sems tsam rNam bden pa la'añ Bod sñia ma dag / sGo ña phyed tshal pa dañ / gZuñ 'dzin grañs mñam pa dañ / sNa tshogs gñis med pa źes gsum du 'byed pa la / Bod phyi ma dag gis dgag pa sna tshogs byas pa ni mi rigs te / de gsum du yod par rGya gar mkhas pa'i gZuñ la grags śiñ don la grub pa'i phyir te / . . .*

I am not sure whom he had in mind with the expression "*Bod sñia ma dag*." As an example of an author who precedes him and who uses almost the same terminology for these three sub-schools, we can point to rGyal tsab rje Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432). In fact he uses in his *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byañ* (ed. Sarnath, 1976, 87 ff. ad MA k°46 ff.) the names "sNa thogs gñis med pa," "**rNam śes** grañs mñam pa," and "sGo ña phyed tshal pa," which are almost the same as those of a later period, but not yet completely the same. Therefore, there is still a need for research into the history of this terminology. On the other hand, in the above two tables, the attribution of Indian dialecticians to the sub-schools differs considerably. To fully clarify this point, an investigation should be made regarding the Indian texts themselves.

The present note is based partially on the summary of my paper (not yet published), which I read at the 32th International Congress of Asian and North African Studies in Hamburg 1986; the revised version of the paper is forthcoming.

Vehicle, there are two [schools, the one which asserts that] the image [in the cognition] (*rnam pa, ākāra*) is real and [the other which asserts that it] is false. (k° XI-2 ab)

[83 b 4] Concerning how [the theory of] this Path of the Great Vehicle — which proclaims that all things are nothing but representation — is maintained, there are two [schools, namely] the *Satyākāravādin (*rNam bden pa*) which maintains that the image (*snañ ba, ābhāsa*) is cognition (*śes pa, jñāna*) and the *Alīkākaravādin (*rNam rdzun pa*) which maintains that the image is superimposed by cognition.

[83 b 5] Among them the master Dignāga²⁸⁾, the great Brāhmaṇa Śaṅkaranandana²⁹⁾ and others maintain the image to be the self-nature of cognition.

[83 b 5] It is said for example in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (k° 6 a-c) [of Dignāga] :

“The internal form to be known, which appears as if it were external, is the object, because it is the self-nature (*rnam śes no bo, vijñāna-rūpa*) of the cognition.”

The great Brāhmaṇa [Śaṅkaranandana] also says in the *Apohasiddhi* :

“What appears is here [cognition] itself. The other [things] do not appear. What does not appear in a cognition cannot

28) Cf. JSSN 202.3-5 : *de la rNam pa dañ bcas pa ni slob dpon Phyogs kyi glañ po la sogs pa dag gi 'dod pa ste /*.

29) His dates were proposed as 9-10 th century by Gnoli (1960; xxiv). His name is normally given as Śaṅkarānanda in the catalogues of the Tibetan Canon, but Frauwallner showed that his correct name is, in fact, Śaṅkaranandana. Cf. — Frauwallner (1933) 241 = (1982) 488 ; — Miyasaka (1971 ; 74 = 1984 ; 393) ; — Bühnemann (1980) 191 n.1. For the identification of his Sanskrit texts, see Bühnemann (1980). See also *infra* n. 30.

even be superimposed in that [cognition].”³⁰⁾

[84 a 1] The master Ārya-Asaṅga, the master Dharmottara, and others maintain the image to be superimposed by cognition.

[84 a 1] It is said in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* [of Asaṅga]³¹⁾ :

“If the object is established as object, a cognition free from constructions (*ye śes rtog pa med, jñānam akalpakam*) would not be possible. Without a [cognition free from constructions] it would not be possible to obtain Buddhahood.”

“When cognition free from constructions operates, no object appears. One should, therefore, know that there is no object.”³²⁾ Without it, representation (*rnam rig, vijñapti*) does not exist.³³⁾”

The master Dharmottara says also [in his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*] :

“If all images exist, even Brahman cannot think that any

30) Concerning the source, see Mimaki (1982) n. 303. The first half of this verse is cited in the *GTCM* (ed. sGo mañ, ña 68 a 5–6 ; ed. bKra śis 'khyil, 563.4) as one of the sources in support of the position of the sGo ña phyed tshal pa. On the other hand, later in our text (BSGT 84 b 4) Śaṅkaranandana is considered to be an advocate of the sNa tshogs gñis med pa (see also *supra* n. 27). A final decision regarding his doctrinal position needs more careful study.

31) These two verses of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* are cited also in the *JSSN* (202.15–23) as a source in support of the position of the rNam pa med pa (Nirākāravādin) of the Yogācāra–vijñānavādin. The Sanskrit text for these two verses is now available in the *ASBh* (42.8–9 ; 42.14–15) :

arthasyārthatva-niṣpattau jñānam na syād akalpakam /
tad-abhāvāc ca buddhatva-prāptir nāivōpapadyate //
jñāna-cāre 'vikalpe hi sarvārthākhyānato 'pi ca /
arthābhāvo 'vagantavyo vijñāptes tad-abhāvataḥ //

It was Lamotte (1938 ; tome II, p. 20* note) who indicated that these two verses are found in the *ASBh* (T. [31] (1606) 715 b 19). For *pāda* c of the second verse, the manuscript (fol. 38 b 3), Tatia's edition and a Sanskrit reconstruction found in Nagao (1982), all have the reading *arthābhāvōpagantavyo*, but it should be corrected as given here. I owe the information for this correction to Lambert Schmithausen.

32) *arthābhāvo 'vagantavyo*. See *supra* n. 31.

33) Translation here according to the Tibetan version. Cf. Skt.: “... , representation [does not exist].”

cognition is erroneous. If [the image], even if not real, appears, even Śata-kratu (brGya byin, i.e. Indra) cannot deny [this fact] by saying that the [image] is not illusory manifested by the cognition. No one can establish that all cognitions (*myoñ ba, anubhava*) are real: therefore there is no doubt that a cognition manifests something unreal.”

[84 a 4] [These] two [schools — the *Satyākāravādin and the *Alīkākāra-vādin —] agree on [the following points]: the external object is not real, cognition cognizes itself (*rañ rig pa, svasaṃvedana*) and the experience which is cognition free from duality (*myoñ ba gñis med pa'i śes pa*) exists in ultimate reality.

[2.2. Philosophers who sometimes take the position of the *Satyākāravādin and sometimes that of the *Alīkākāravādin]

It is accepted that some learned masters did not oppose the system of either (the *Satyākāravādin or the *Alīkākāravādin).

(k° XI- 2 cd)

[84 a 5] It is accepted that both masters, Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti, have taught having adopted part of both [schools, namely] the *Satyākāravādin (*rNam bden pa*) and the *Alīkākāravādin (*rNam rdzun pa*).

[84 a 5] [Vasubandhu] says in the *Trimśikā* (kk° 1-2 ab) [from the *Satyākāravādin's point of view]:

“The diverse metaphoric constructions of Self and things (*bdag dan chos su ñer 'dogs pa, ātma-dharmōpacāra*) which arise are the transformation of consciousness (*rnam par śes par gyur, vijñāna-*

pariṇāma). This transformation is threefold : maturation (*rnam par smin*, *vipāka*, viz. *ālayavijñāna*), what is called self-conceiving (*ñar sems*, *mananākhya*, viz. *kliṣṭamānas*) and the representation of objects (*yul la rnam par rig pa*, *viṣayasya vijñaptir*, viz. *the six pravṛtti-vijñāna*). ”

[84 a 6] He says also in the *Vimśatikā* (k° 1) [from the *Alīkā-kāravādin's point of view] :

“[All] this is nothing but representation because the object which does not exist appears, just as a man suffering from partial blindness (*rab rib can*, *taimirika*) sees hairs or a [double] moon which do not exist [in reality]. ”

[84 b 1] [Dharmakīrti] says in the *Satyākāravādin's manner] in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (III k° 328) :

“The self-nature of this [cognition] has the form of blue and the other [objects], and is a perception (*myoñ ba*, *anubhava*).³⁴⁾ Even though it is the perception of its own form, it appears as the perception of blue and the other [objects], ”

and also in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (I k° 59 a-c) :

“Therefore the appearing object and the cognition of that [appearing object],³⁵⁾ even if the external object existed, are not different [from each other]. Consequently the cognition has two forms (*tshul gñis ñid*, *dvi-rūpatā*) [namely, the form of the object and that of the cognition itself]. ”

[84 b 2] He says [also] in the *Alīkā-kāravādin's manner [in PVn I kk° 39 – 40 = PV III kk° 330 c– 332 b] :

34) Translation from the Sanskrit. Cf. Tib. : “Because the nature of the [cognition] is the [color] blue and the other [objects], the self-nature [of it] is also a perception.”

35) *de blo* BSGT, *blo de* PVn. The reading of BSGT seems better.

“[The cognition] which without the forms of the cognized and the cognizer is thus set forth in the way it is seen, by those who are in error (*’khrul pa, bhrānta*), as bifurcating (*bslad pa, viplava*) into the forms of the apprehended and the apprehender having distinct characteristics — just like the distinction of [erroneous] cognition in the case of hair [nets] and so forth — then its having the characteristics of apprehended and apprehender is not to be objected to.”

[2.3. The internal divisions of the *Satyākāravādin and the *Alīkākāravādin]

[84 b 4] [Here follows] the exposition of the divisions of the Mind Only [school].

Certain [philosophers] maintain that the diverse [images] are not different [from the cognition, and certain others state] that there exist as many [cognitions] as the number [of images, and others say] that the cognition and the image (*ṛnam pa, ākāra*) are counterparts. (k° XI– 3 ab)

[84 b 4] The great Brāhmaṇa [Śaṅkaranandana]³⁶⁾ and the author of the *Pramāṇavārttika* [–bhāṣy] *ālaṅkāra* (=Prajñākaragupta)³⁷⁾ maintain :

36) See *supra* n. 29.

37) Prajñākaragupta’s doctrinal position as an advocate of *citrādvaitavāda* can be seen, for example, in the following passages of his *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* : — PVBh 286.4 : . . . *sakala-nīlādy-ākārā buddhir ekāiva citrākārā* / ; — PVBh 287.22 : *citrābhāsāpi buddhir ekāiva* . . . See Oki (1975), Iwata (1991) 56 – 64, 211 – 212, 246 – 250, etc. ; see also Oki (1973).

as the images [which appear] as an object are [nothing but] cognition, the images which appear as diverse [things] also have for their self-nature only one cognition.³⁸⁾ The master Śākyabuddhi³⁹⁾ and others state that as many cognitions exist as the number of the forms (*rnam pa*, *ākāra*) of atoms existing in visible matter, sound and the other [objects].⁴⁰⁾ Moreover [there are some who] maintain that the image and the cognition are counterparts.⁴¹⁾ Thus there are three divisions of the *Satyākāravādins.

There are two divisions of the *Alīkākāravādins, [namely,]
the “Impurity Possessing” (*Dri bcas pa*) and the “Spotless”
(*Dri med pa*). (k° XI–3 cd)

38) This position is what is termed *sNa tshogs gñis med pa* (Citrādvaita) in such later doxographical works as GTCM and CKGT. See *supra* n. 27.

39) His dates were proposed as c. 660–720 by Frauwallner (1961; 145 = 1982; 867), c. 650–700 by Miyasaka (1970–1971; II 88). He is said to be a disciple of Devendrabuddhi, who is himself a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti. While Devendrabuddhi wrote his commentary on the *PV* chapters II–IV in continuation of Dharmakīrti’s own commentary (the so-called *svavṛtti*) on chapter I, Śākyabuddhi composed his text as a sub-commentary on these earlier explanations, covering all four chapters of the *PV*; cf. Steinkellner (1980) 283. His name was given as Śākyabuddhi in Frauwallner (1933; 238) = (1982; 485), then as “Śākyamati (or Śākyabuddhi)” in Frauwallner (1961; 145) = (1982; 867). Recent scholars use either the name Śākyamati (Gnoli [1960], Steinkellner [1980], Iwata [1981], Inami [1990], Iwata [1991]), or Śākyabuddhi (Stcherbatsky [1962] I 39–45, Hakamaya [1976] 240–241, Matsumoto [1980–1981]). Most recently, while editing his *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* according to a newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript, Inami (1991; 356 & 352 n.2) has decided on the name Śākyabuddhi, based mainly on 1°) Mvyut 3489, and 2°) his transcribed name in the *Tshad ma rnam nes kyi brgyud pa* of Bu ston (Tohoku 5170 [40]), as indicated by Miyasaka (1971; 88, 50) = (1984; 376, 424). The passage in the *Tshad ma rnam nes kyi brgyud pa* of Bu ston is as follows: *om āḥ namaḥ Śā kya bu ddha ye hūm* /; cf. Tohoku 5170 (40) = *The Collected Works of Bu-ston*, ed. Lokesh Chandra, Śatapiṭaka 56, New Delhi, 1969, vol. 16 (*Ma*), 22.5–6. In the forthcoming “Systematische Überblick über Pramāṇa-Literatur,” also by Ernst Steinkellner “Śākyabuddhi (*Śākyamati)” is chosen. I owe this information to Helmut Krasser. It seems, therefore, that Śākyabuddhi is the correct form of his name.

40) This position is what is termed *gZuñ ’dzin grañs mñam pa* in such later doxographical works as GTCM and CKGT. See *supra* n. 27.

41) This position is what is termed *sGo ña phyed tshal pa* in such later doxographical works as GTCM and CKGT. See *supra* n. 27. Concerning this position, see also Fukuda (1987) and Kobayashi (1988).

[84 b 6] Those who maintain, [as do] the master Vinītadeva⁴²⁾ and others, that false images exist [even] in the Buddha stage (*saṅs rgyas kyi sa, buddha-bhūmi*) are the “Impurity Possessing” (*Dri bcas pa*). Those who admit, [as do] the master Dharmottara⁴³⁾ and others, that they do not exist in the Buddha stage are the “Spotless” (*Dri med pa*). Thus there are two divisions.⁴⁴⁾

[85 a 1] Among them the *Satyākāravādin maintains that the

42) dBus pa blo gsal gives no source in support of the idea that Vinītadeva is an advocate of the *Dri bcas pa* branch of the *rNam rdzun pa*, but in the *sTag tshan grub mtha' rari 'grel* of *sTag tshan lo tsa ba Śes rab rin chen* (1405-?), the *Santānāntarasiddhiṭkā* of Vinītadeva is cited to show this. Cf. TTGTRG 71 b 2-4 : *rGyud gžan grub par yañ "bcom ldan 'das kyi don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste /"* (*Santānāntarasiddhi* of Dharmakīrti, in *Bibliotheca Buddhica* 19 (1916) 71-72 = P. [130] (5716) ce 404 b 1, Eng. tr. Kitagawa (1965) 429, Jap. tr. Katsura (1983) 114) *žes gsuñs la / de'i 'grel byed slob dpon Dul ba lhas ni / "mñam par gžag pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rjes las thob pa so sor rtog pa'i ye šes kyi gžan gyi sems mkhyen la ye šes gžan gyis ni ma yin no // ye šes de ni gzuñ 'dzin dan bcas kyañ / de ñid kyi log pa ñid du gziḡs pa'i phyir /"* (see below *Bibl. Buddhica* 19 (1916) 73.4-13) *žes sogs ni Dri bcas pa dan /*. The same passage of the *Santānāntarasiddhiṭkā* is cited in the same context in GTCM *ña* 74 a 1-2 and also in CKGT 212.20-213.1 (Hakamaya (1976) 246), even though lCañ skya is rather sceptical concerning this division. To our surprise, however, in the *bsTan 'gyur* version of Vinītadeva's *ṭkā*, there is a negative particle in the boldfaced passage; cf. *Bibl. Buddhica* 19 (1916) 73.4-13 = P. [136] (5724) *tshe* 21 a 1-4, D. (4238) *ž* 50 b 4-6 : . . . *so sor rtog pa'i ye šes 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye šes kyi rjes las thob pa gzuñ ba dan 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa dan ldan pas / . . . de la gzuñ ba dan 'dzin par rnam par rtog pa yod par khas blañs pas phyin ci log pa yañ ma yin te / de phyin ci ma log pa ñid du gziḡs pa'i phyir ro //*. Therefore, if the Tibetan attribution of Vinītadeva to the *Dri bcas pa* branch of the *rNam rdzun pa* is based only on this passage, viz. on a misreading of it, this attribution is by the force of things completely doubtful. On the other hand, we cannot deny, nevertheless, the fact that the division of the *rNam rdzun pa* into two sub-schools, namely the *Dag pa* (= *Dri med pa*) and the *Dri bcas pa*, already existed in an Indian text, namely the *Sarvayānālokaviśeṣa-bhāṣya* or *Sarvayānālokakara-vaibhāṣya-nāma* of Subhūtiḡhoṣa (see *supra* n. 27), even though no proper name was cited there. A more careful and systematic study should be done concerning this division.

43) Above, in BSGT 84 a 3, Dharmottara's *Pramānaviniścaya-ṭkā* was cited to show his position as an advocate of the *rNam rdzun pa*, but no precise source is shown in BSGT to indicate his position as a follower of the *rNam rdzun Dri ma med pa* school.

44) As we have seen in *supra* n. 27, these two terms indicating the branches of the *rNam rdzun pa*, viz. *Dri bcas pa* and *Dri ma med pa*, are not purely inventions of Tibetan authors; we can find approximately, though not precisely, the same terminology in an Indian text, namely Subhūtiḡhoṣa (Rab 'byor dbyaṅs)'s *Sarvayānālokaviśeṣa-bhāṣya* or *Sarvayānālokakara-vaibhāṣya-nāma*. His *rNam rdzun dag pa* corresponds to the *Dri med pa* of our text and his *Dri ma dan bcas pa* to the *Dri bcas pa* of our text.

object-universal (*don spyi*, **sāmānyârtha*), the double moon (*zla ba gñis*, *dvican-dra*) and other [objects] are also the self-nature of the cognition (*śes pa'i dños po*). For as it is said in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (III kk° 9 c–10 c) :

“[Objection :] If the universal (*spyi*, *sāmānya*) is the object as the self-nature of cognition, the absurd consequence will arise [that the universal is also the proper character (*svalakṣaṇa*)].

[Answer :] There is no fault, because it is so⁴⁵⁾ accepted. For ⁴⁶⁾the universal (*spyi*, *sāmānya*) as the self-nature of the image⁴⁷⁾ is apprehended similarly in all [things]⁻⁴⁶⁾,”

and also [in PV III k° 16 c–d] :

“The [blue in a dream] is a cognition, because one perceives by oneself what is not perceived by people who are in a suitable place [to perceive it] (*run yul*, *yogya-deśaka*). A name and the other [factors]⁴⁸⁾ are [also] explained by this [case].”

[85 a 2] The *Alīkākāravādin maintains that the object, even though it does not exist [in reality], [appears] by force of the habitual persistence (*goms pa*, *abhyāsa*) of the impregnations (*bag chags*, *vāsanā*)

45) *I. e.*, that the universal is also *svalakṣaṇa* as the nature of cognition.

46) Here translated from the Tibetan text. If we translate from the Sanskrit text: “there is the universal as the self-nature of the [external] object, because there is the universal [depending on the differentiation from other things (*tad-vyāvṛtti-samāśrayāt*)] in all [things].”

47) *nam pa'i ño bo ñid kyi* (*ākāra-rūpatvena*) BSGT, *don gyi ño bo ñid kyi* (*artha-rūpatvena*) PV. Both BSGT and PV have *kyi*; we would like to read this as *kyis*. The reading *nam pa'i* of BSGT could be a wrong citation owing to a confusion of memory, but we have tried to translate according to the reading of BSGT. Cf. — PVBh 191.20 : *arthasya bāhyasya rūpeṇa samānatā* /; — PVV 104.8–9 : *artha-rūpatvenādhyavasīyamāna-jñeya-rūpatvena samānatā* . . .

48) If a “name” existed, separate from the consciousness, in the external world, everyone who is near it would have heard it. “*Miñ sogs*” (*nāmādi*) here means *nāma* (name) and *nimitta* (characteristic). Dharmakīrti argues here as a Sautrāntika, who is *nāma-nimitta-vādin*, and denies the opinion of the Vaibhāṣika that the name exists in the external world. Cf. PVBh 194.21–23 : *na hi Sautrāntikasyēva nāma-nimitta-vādinah sidhyati vyatirekah / manaskārādīmātrena nāma-nimitta-viṣayābhimatāyā buddher bhāvāt* /. See Tosaki (1979) 49–50, 78–79.

of ignorance. As is said in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (I k° 39 ab = PV III k° 330 cd)⁴⁹⁾ :

“[The cognition] does not have the forms of the cognized and the cognizer, just like the distinction of [erroneous] cognition in the case of [illusory] hair [nets] and so forth.”

[3. The five categories (*gzi lña, pañca-vastu*)]

[3.1. Matter (*gzugs, rūpa*)]

[85 a 4] Among the five categories (*gzi lña, pañca-vastu*) which are knowables, [here follows] an explanation of the category “matter” (*gzugs kyi gzi, *rūpa-vastu*).

Appearance as matter [by virtue] of the habitual persistence (*goms pa, abhyāsa*) of impregnations (*bag chags, vāsanā*) is the category “matter.” [According to the *Satyākāravādin] it is the self-nature (*dños po*) [of the cognition], and [according to the *Alīkākāravādin] it is superimposed (*btags pa, samāroṇa*) [by cognition]. (k° XI- 4 ab)

[85 a 4] The mind (*sems, citta*) and the mental factors (*sems las byun ba, caitta*), appearing as matter by virtue of the impregnation, are the category “matter.” It is the self-nature of the cognition (*ses pa'i dños po*) according to the *Satyākāravādin (*rNam bden pa*), and it is superimposed (*sgro btags pa, samāroṇa*) by cognition according to the *Alīkākāravādin (*rNam rdzun pa*).

49) This verse has already been cited above in BSGT 84 b 2 - 3.

[85 a 5] According to both [systems, the *Satyākāravādin and the *Alikākāravādin, the following is commonly accepted:] the four gross elements (*'byuñ ba chen po, mahābhūta*)—the element earth (*sa'i kham, pṛthivī-dhātu*) and the rest—which are causal matter (*rgyu'i gzugs*), are the appearance of solidness (*sra ba, khara*) and the rest. In resultant matter (*'bras bu'i gzugs*) produced from the gross elements (*'byuñ ba las gyur pa, bhautika*), the five sense-faculties (*dbañ po, indriya*) such as the eye are supports (*rten, āśraya*) of cognition (*rnam par śes pa, vijñāna*), are material (*gzugs can, rūpin*) and subtle (*dañ ba, prasāda*),⁵⁰⁾ and are the object of the mental [consciousness] (*yid kyi yul, mano-gocara*); the appearance of five objects such as visible matter and the others (*gzugs la sogs pa yul lñar*)⁵¹⁾ *snan ba*) are the objects of the cognitions of the visual and other faculties. Non-information (*rnam par rig byed ma yin pa, avijñapti*) is invisible (*bstan du med, anidarśana*) and non-resistant (*thogs pa med pa, apratigha*), is an act consequent to will (*bsam*)⁵²⁾ *pa'i las, cetayitvā karman*), is born from a cause which is information (*rnam par rig byed, vijñapti*) or contemplation (*tiñ ñe 'dzin, samādhi*), is a good or bad [act]⁵³⁾ comprised in discipline (*sdom pa, saṃvara*) or non-discipline (*sdom pa ma yin pa, asaṃvara*) or what is neutral (*bar ma, madhya*).⁵⁴⁾ All these do not exist separately from the mind and the mental factors.

50) Cf. AKBh 24.4: *rūpa-prasāda / gzugs dañ ba* [(Tib.) P. 46 b 5].

51) The original reading of BSGT: *snar* should be corrected to *lñar*.

52) The reading *bsam* should normally be *bsams*; cf. AK Index by Hirakawa (1978) 310. But the reading *bsam* exists also as a variant; cf. AKBh (Tib.) P. 190 a 7, 191 b 3, etc.

53) Cf. AKBh 8.9 (ad AK I k°11): *saṃśatas tu vijñapti-samādhi-saṃbhūtaṃ kuśalā-kuśala-rūpaṃ avijñaptiḥ* // (Tib.) P. 33 b 3–4: *mdor na rnam par rig byed dañ tiñ ñe 'dzin las byuñ ba'i gzugs dge ba dañ mi dge ba ni rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'o* //.

54) Cf. — AK IV k°13 ab: *avijñaptis tridhā jñeyā saṃvarāsaṃvarêtarā* / (Tib.) *rnam rig min rnam gsum źes bya / sdom dañ sdom pa min dañ gžan* //; — AKBh 210.20: *... saṃvarāsaṃvara-madhya-sthā ...* / (Tib.) P. 207 a 1: *... sdom pa dañ sdom pa ma yin pa dañ bar ma la gnas pa ...*

[3.2. Mind (*sems*, *citta*) : The number of types of consciousness which certain philosophers maintain]

[85 b 1] Explaining the category “mind” (*sems kyi gzi*, **citta-vastu*) :

The positions [are] three : [certain philosophers] maintain the mind to be eight groups of consciousness, [certain others] to be six [groups] and [others] to be one.

(k° XI- 4 cd)

[The copulative verb] “are” is to be understood [as completing the meaning of this verse]. The mind grasps the object in its general aspect.⁵⁵⁾ There are three opinions regarding that mind : that it consists of eight groups of consciousness, that it is six [groups], and that it is one.

[3.2.1. Those who maintain eight groups of consciousness]

[85 b 3] Among these [three positions], the master Ārya-Asaṅga, the master Vasubandhu and other [philosophers] maintain eight groups of consciousness. For they maintain as it is said in the *Laṅkāvatāra* [–*sūtra*] (X k°102) :

“The mind is the receptacle-consciousness (*kun gzi'i rnam śes*, *ālaya-vijñāna*). The ‘Mind’ (*vid*, *manas*) is self-conceiving (*ñar sems*,

55) Cf. — MAnVBh ad MAnV I k° 8 : *tatrārtha-dṛṣṭir vijñānaṃ tad-viśeṣe tu caitasāḥ* // (I k° 8) *tatrārtha-mātre dṛṣṭir vijñānaṃ / artha-viśeṣe dṛṣṭiś caitasā vedanādayaḥ* / (Tib.) Yamaguchi (1966 a) 9.3–6 : *de la don mthoñ rnam par śes* // *de yi khyad par sems las byuñ* // (I k° 8) *žes bya ba'o* // *don tsam mthoñ ba ni rnam par śes pa'o* // *don gyi khyad par mthoñ ba ni sems las byuñ ba rnams te tshor ba la sogs pa'o* // ; — TBh 15.18–19 : *cittaṃ vastu-mātra-grāhakaṃ jñānaṃ* / (Tib.) P. 368 b 8 : *sems ni dños po tsam 'dzin pa'i śes pa yin la* /. See also the reference to many other sources in Kajiyama (1966) 47 = (1989) 234 n. 98.

manyānātmaka).⁵⁶⁾ What grasps objects is said to be the cognition (*rnam par śes, vijñāna*), ”

and because it is said also in the *Trimśikā* (kk° 1 – 2 ab, cf. BSGT 84 a 6) :

“This transformation is threefold : the maturation (*rnam par smin, vipāka, viz. ālayavijñāna*), what is called self-conceiving (*nar sems, mananākhyā*,⁵⁶⁾ viz. *kliṣṭamanas*) and the representation of objects (*yul la rnam par rig pa, viśayasya vijñaptir, viz. six pravṛttivijñāna*). ”

[3.2.1. a. Receptacle-consciousness (*kun gzi'i rnam par śes pa, ālaya-vijñāna*)⁵⁷⁾]

The maturation (*rnam smin, vipāka, viz. ālayavijñāna*) contains all the latent seeds (*sa bon, bīja*). It is associated with the five [mental factors], namely, cognitive contact (*reg, sparśa*) and the [four] others. (k° XI- 5 ab)

[85 b 5] Among these [eight forms of consciousness], the maturation (*rnam par smin pa, vipāka*) is the receptacle-consciousness (*kun gzi'i rnam par śes pa, ālayavijñāna*). It is not impeded [by “Defilements”] (*ma bsgribs, anivṛta*), is neutral (*luñ du ma bstan pa, avyākṛta*), and is the support (*rten, sthāna*)⁵⁸⁾ of all the latent seeds of the whole round of existences and deliverance

56) Cf. — MAnVBh 48.12 (ad MAnV III k°22) : . . . *tatra mano yan nityaṃ manyānākāram* / (Tib.) Yamaguchi (1966 a) 68.5 – 6 : *de la yid ni gañ rtag tu rlom sems pa ni* (sic, read *pa'i*) *rnam pa'o* //; — MAnVBh cited in MAVT 162.13 : *tatra mano yan nityaṃ mananākāram iti* / (Tib.) P. [109] (5534) *tshi* 103 a 3 – 4 : *de la yid ni gañ rtag tu rlom sems pa'i rnam pa'o žes bya ba la* /.

57) Concerning this subject, see the recently published, very detailed study by Lambert Schmithausen : *Ālayavijñāna, On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*, 2 vols, Part I : Text, Part II : Notes, Bibliography and Indices, Tokyo, the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987.

58) Cf. TrśBh 18.23 – 24 : *tatra sarva-sāṃkleśika-dharma-bīja-sthānatvād ālayaḥ / ālayaḥ sthānam iti paryāyau* / (Tib.) P. [113] (5565) *si* 174 a 5 – 6 ; D. (4064) *śi* 149 b 6 : *de kun nas ñon moñs pa'i chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi* (gyis P.) *gnas yin pas kun gzi ste / kun gzi dañ rten žes bya ba ni rnam grañs su gtogs pa'o* //.

(*'khor 'das, *saṃsāra-nirvāṇa*). The aspect of maturation of the receptacle-consciousness is so named because, by virtue of the impregnations of the previous good or bad acts, it is projected in this life as the mind of [beings who are in] upper realms (*mtho ris, svarga*) and bad realms (*ñan 'gro, durgati*). The aspect of [latent] seeds is so named because in it (*viz. ālayavijñāna*) there exist good or other impregnations from beginningless time (*thog ma med pa, anādi*).

[86 a 1] It is said in the same [treatise, the *Trimśikā* k° 2 cd and k° 4 b] :

“Among these [three transformations], the maturation is the receptacle-consciousness⁵⁹⁾ and it contains all the latent seeds.”

And also,

“It is not impeded [by “Defilements”] (*ma bsgribs, anivṛta*) and is neutral (*luṇi ma bstan, avyākṛta*). ”

[86 a 1] Moreover, so long as the receptacle-consciousness exists, it is associated with the five universal [mental factors] (*kun tu 'gro ba, sarvatra-ga*), namely, cognitive contact (*reg pa, sparśa*), attention (*yid la byed pa, manaskāra*), sensation (*tshor ba, vedanā*), notion (*'du ses, saṃjñā*) and volition (*sems pa, cetanā*). So long as the round of existence (*'khor ba, saṃsāra*) [continues], cause and effect arise without interval. When one obtains the knowledge of the destruction [of “Defilements”] (*zad pa ses pa, kṣaya-jñāna*) and the knowledge of the non-production [of future “Defilements”] (*mi skye ba ses pa, anutpāda-jñāna*), the Badness (*gnas ñan len, dauṣṭhulya*) is totally eliminated: the [receptacle-consciousness] therefore has come to an end (*ldog pa, vyāvṛtta*).

59) Skt. : “the consciousness called receptacle . . .”

[86 a 3] It is also said in the same [treatise, the *Trimṣikā* (k° 3 cd and k° 4 c²–5 a(Skt.) = k° 4d–5a(Tib.))] :

“[The receptacle–consciousness is] always associated with cognitive contact, attention, sensation, notion and volition.”

“It continues (*rgyun 'bab, vartate srotasā*) as a stream (*chu bo, ogha*) and it stops at the level of an Arhat.”

[86 a 3] We know that the [receptacle–consciousness] exists according to the proclamation in the *Samḍhinirmocana* [–*sūtra*] :

“The appropriation–consciousness (*len pa'i rnam par śes pa, ādāna-jñāna*), ⁶⁰⁾ profound and subtle, continues with all latent seeds like a stream. I did not teach it to ordinary people (*byis pa, bāla*), lest they might take it for a Self.”

[3.2.1. b. The ‘Defiled Mind’ (*ñon moṅs can gyi yid, klišṭamanas*)]

Self–conceiving is the ‘Defiled Mind’ (*ñon moṅs can gyi yid, klišṭamanas*), and it is different from the former (*viz. ālayavijñāna*) and the latter (*viz. pravṛttivijñāna*). (k° XI–5 cd)

[86 a 5] Self–conceiving is the ‘Defiled Mind.’ It arises from the receptacle–consciousness and takes this [receptacle–consciousness] as object [in the form of] a Self (*ña, aham*) and what belongs to a Self (*ña yi, mama*). It is said in the *Trimṣikā* (k° 5 b–d) :

“Based on it (*viz. ālayavijñāna*), there arises the consciousness named ‘Mind’ (*yid, manas*) which takes it (*viz. ālaya–vijñāna*) as

60) The two reasons why this consciousness is called *ādāna–vijñāna* are explained, for example, in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* I. 5 ; see Lamotte (1973) I 4–5 ; II 14–15, Nagao (1982) 85–86 ; (1) *dbañ po gzugs can thams cad kyi rgyu yin pa dan* / (2) *lus thams cad ñe bar len pa'i gnas su gyur pa'i phyir te* / [reconstruction into Skt. in Nagao (1982) 11 : (1) *sarva–rūpīndriyōpādānatvena*, (2) *sarvātmabhāvōpādānāśrayatvena ca*].

object and which is self-conceiving.”

[86 a 5] The [‘Mind’] is different from the former (*viz. ālaya-vijñāna*) and the latter *citta* (*viz. pravṛttivijñāna*). As the master Sthiramati explains: “By the [third line of the verse Trś k° 5] ‘... named ‘Mind’ which takes it as object,’ [the author, Vasubandhu] distinguishes [the ‘Mind’] from the receptacle-consciousness and the active cognition (*’jug pa’i rnam par śes pa, pravṛttivijñāna*).”

[The ‘Defiled Mind’] is neutral⁶¹⁾ and is accompanied by the four “Defilements” (*ñon moṅs, kleśa*). (k° XI 5 d²–6 a)

[86 b 1] The [‘Defiled Mind’] is always impeded and neutral (*bsgribs la lun du ma bstan pa, nivṛtavyākṛta*).⁶¹⁾ It is always accompanied by the four “Defilements,” namely, having in regard to the [five] aggregates which are the basis of clinging to existence (*ñe bar len pa’i phuṅ po, upādāna-skandha*) the [wrong] view of a Self (*bdag tu lta ba, ātma-drṣṭi*), the delusion of a Self (*bdag tu rmoṅs pa, ātma-moha*), the conceit of a Self (*bdag tu na rgyal ba, ātma-māna*) and attachment to a Self (*bdag tu chags pa, ātma-sneha*). In the same way it is associated with the five universal [mental factors] (*kun tu ’gro ba, sarvatra-ga*), namely, cognitive contact (*reg pa, sparśa*), attention (*yid la byed pa, manas-kāra*), sensation (*tshor ba, vedanā*), notion (*’du śes, saṃjñā*) and volition (*sems pa, cetanā*). Moreover, concerning these [“Defilements” and mental factors, the ‘Defiled Mind’ is associated] with those [of the plane and the stage] where [the being (*sems can, prāṇin*)⁶²⁾] is born, but not with those of the other planes (*khamś, dhātu*) and stages (*sa, bhūmi*). It is also said in the *Trīṃśikā* (k° 6–7 ab¹):

61) In Trś kk° 6–7 (cf. Mimaki (1982) n. 324), “*nivṛtavyākṛta*” is an adjective modifying “*kleśa*.” dBus pa blo gsal seems to take it to modify “*kliṣṭa-manas*,” which is not impossible. Cf. TrśT 474.41: *nivṛtavyākṛtaṃ hi kliṣṭaṃ manah* /.

62) Cf. TrśT 475.34–36: *yasmin dhātau yasyām vā bhūmau jāto bhavati prāṇī tad(–) dhātukais tad–bhūmikair eva satkāyadrṣṭy–ādibhis tat samprayujyate, ...*; (Tib.) 75.1–2: *khamś gaṇi daṇi sa gaṇi du srog chags skyes par gyur pa’i khamś de pa daṇi / sa de pa ṇid kyi ’jig tshogs la lta ba la sogs pa daṇi* (P. om. *daṇi*) *de mtshuṅs par ldan te / ...*

“It is always associated with the four “Defilements” which are impeded and neutral (*bsgribs la luñ du ma bstan pa, nivṛtāvyākṛta*) ; “Defilements” called the [wrong] view of a Self, the delusion of a Self, the conceit of a Self and attachment to a Self ; “Defilements” which belong to the [plane and the stage] where [the being (*sems can, prāṇin*)⁶²] is born. It (the ‘Defiled Mind’) is also [accompanied by the mental factors] such as cognitive contact.”

[The ‘Defiled Mind’] does not exist in the three [states] of the Arhat and so forth. (k° XI- 6 b)

[86 b 4] The ‘Defiled Mind’ does not exist in the Arhat, because he has eliminated all “Defilements.” In the same way, it does not exist either in the attainment of cessation (*’gog pa’i sñoms par ’jug pa, nirodha-samā-patti*) or on the Path surpassing the world (*’jig rten las ’das pa’i lam, lokottara-mārga*). For [in the attainment of cessation] it is stopped by virtue of the Path, and [on the Path surpassing the world] the seeing of non-substantiality (*bdag med pa mthoñ ba, nairātmyadarśana*) is the antidote (*gñen po, pratipakṣa*) to the [wrong] view of a Self, etc. (*bdag la sogs par*⁶³) *lta ba, ātma-darśana*). As it is said in the same [treatise, the *Trimśikā* k° 7 b²-d] :

“The [‘Defiled Mind’] does not exist for the Arhat. It exists neither in the attainment of cessation nor on the Path surpassing the world.”

63) The meaning of “*la sogs par*” is not clear. These words do not exist in the Sanskrit text, but do exist already in the *bsTan ’gyur* version of Tibetan text ; this is, therefore, not an invention of our author, dBus pa blo gsal. Cf. TrśBh 24.20–21 (ad Trś k° 7) : *nairātmya-darśanasyātma-darśana-pratipakṣatvān na lokottara-mārga pravartitum utsahe(ta)* / ; (Tib.) P. 179 b 8–180 a 1 ; D. 154 a 5–6 : *bdag med par mthoñ ba ni bdag la sogs par lta ba’i gñen po yin pas ’jig rten las ’das pa’i lam na de* (P. *lam de*) *’byuñ bar mi nus te* /.

[3.2.1. c. Active cognitions (*'jug pa'i rnam śes, pravṛttivijñāna*)]

The active cognitions, which cognize objects such as visible matter, are of six kinds. (k° XI-6 cd)

[86 b 6] [They are named] “active cognitions” (*'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa, pravṛtti-vijñāna*), because they act by distinguishing objects (*gyul la chad cin 'jug pa*), or because they act having clear forms (*rnam pa gsal bar, *sphu-tākāreṇa*). They are of six kinds. They grasp the objects which have the nature of visible matter, sound, smell, taste, the tangible and the object of thought (*chos, dharma*). As it is said also in the *Ghanavyūha* [–*sūtra*] :

“What [has the function of] representing an object is a active cognition,”

and also in the *Trimśikā* (k° 8 bc) :

“The third [*vijñāna-pariṇāma*]⁶⁴⁾ is the apprehension of six kinds of objects.”

[87 a 2] Because they deposit good or other impregnations (*bag chags, vāsanā*) [in it], these [active cognitions] form the causal condition (*rgyu'i rkyen, hetu-pratyaya*) for the fundamental consciousness (*ritsa ba'i rnam śes, mūlavijñāna, viz. ālayavijñāna*) to remain in the round of existence (*'khor ba, saṃsāra*) : The impregnations [for their part] form the causal condition for the active cognition[s] ; therefore there is wandering in the round of existence.

[3.2.1. d. Transformation of the base (*gnas gyur pa, āśraya-parāvṛtti*)⁶⁵⁾]

[87 a 3] When one has become a Buddha, the receptacle[–con-

64) As we have seen above, the first *vijñāna-pariṇāma* is *ālayavijñāna* and the second, *kliṣṭa-manas*.

65) See a recent study on this subject ; H. Sakuma, *Die Āśraya-parāvṛtti-Theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi*, 2 vols, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 40, herausgegeben vom Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets an der Universität Hamburg, Stuttgart, 1990.

sciousness], transformed into the mirror-like-gnosis, forms the support for the other three gnoses. As it is said in the [*Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra* (IX k°67) :

“The mirror-gnosis (*me lon ye śes, ādarśa-jñāna*) is immovable. Three gnoses depend on it, these being [the gnosis] as to equality, differential observation and accomplishment of what is to be done.”

The ‘Defiled Mind’ is transformed into the gnosis of equality (*mñam pa ñid kyi ye śes, samatā-jñāna*), the mental consciousness (*vid kyi śes pa, manovi-jñāna*) into the gnosis of differential observation (*so sor rtog pa'i ye śes, pratyavekṣā-jñāna*) and the consciousness of the five media (*sgo lña'i śes pa, *pañca-dvāra-vijñāna, viz. pañcēndriya-vijñāna*) into the gnosis of accomplishment of what is to be done (*bya ba grub pa'i ye śes, kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna*).

[87 a 5] These [points above] are the doctrinal positions of those who maintain eight groups of consciousness.

[3.2.2. Those who maintain six groups of consciousness]

[There is] a doctrinal position which maintains that the above-mentioned six cognitions are the six groups of self-cognitions. (k° XI- 7 ab)

[87 a 5] The master Dignāga, the master Dharmakīrti and others maintain that the six groups of cognitions are self-cognitions. These are exactly the above-mentioned⁶⁶⁾ six active cognitions. And these are already explained in relation to the two schools of the Yogācāra.⁶⁷⁾

66) Cf. *supra* BSGT 86 b 6 – 87 a 3.

67) Cf. *supra* BSGT 84 a 4 – 5.

[3.2.3. Those who maintain a single consciousness]

A single mental consciousness (*yid śes, manovijñāna*) appears diversely on the basis of sense-faculties.⁶⁸⁾ (k° XI-7 cd)

[87 a 6] The Bodhisattva who accepts the single consciousness (gCig pur smra ba'i byañ chub sems dpa')⁶⁹⁾ [maintains the following:] the single mental consciousness (*yid kyi śes pa, manovijñāna*) appears as the diverse cognitions of visible matter, sound and the other [objects] on the basis of sense-faculties⁶⁸⁾ such as the eye, just as a single monkey in a house with six windows appears as many [through each window]. For it is said in a Sūtra⁷⁰⁾:

“Beings have [a single] flow of consciousness each,”

and it is said also in the **Dvādaśāyatananirdeśa* (*sKye mched bcu gñis bstan pa'i mdo*)⁷¹⁾:

“The six consciousnesses are comprised in the sense-field of the mind (*yid kyi skye mched, mana-āyatana*).”

68) Cf. AKBh 380.8: *indriyatas* / (Tib.) P. [115] (5591) *ñu* 42 a 2 : *dbañ po'i sgo nas*.

69) Cf. MSam-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu (P. [112] (5551) *li* 173 a 6, ad MSam II 12) : *byañ chub sems dpa' kha cig ni yid kyi rnam par śes pa gcig pu ñid du 'dod do* //. Cf. Hakamaya (1976) 250 n. 34.

70) The original source is yet to be identified. This Sūtra is cited in the MAV of Śāntara-kṣita (P. 62 b 2, D. 65 b 6 ; ed. Ichigō: (1985 a) 132, (1985 b) 146, ad MA k°49) as counter-evidence to the opinion of some philosophers (probably Śākyabuddhi, cf. Iwata (1981) 156 [19] [21], Ichigō: (1985 b) 198 n. 21, n. 23), who maintain that many cognitions of the same kind can appear simultaneously.

71) BSGT 87 b 2 “*sKye mched bcu gñis bstan pa'i mdo las kyañ / rnam par śes pa drug ni yid kyi skye mched kyis bsdus pa'o źes gsuñs pa'i phyir*” is an approximate paraphrase of the MSam II 12 C (Lamotte (1973) 30.5–7 ; Nagao (1982) 69.8–9, reconstr. Skt. 69.20–21 ; Fr. Tr. 103 ; Jap. Tr. 311) : *yañ skye mched gcu gñis bstan pa las rnam par śes pa'i tshogs drug ni yid kyi skye mched do źes ji skad gsuñs pa lta bu'o* // (reconstr. Skt.) *punaś ca dvādaśāyatanānāṃ deśitānāṃ yathōktaṃ śaḍ-vijñānakāyā mana-āyatanam iti* /. Thus in the MSam, “*skye mched bcu gñis bstan pa*” seems not to be considered as a proper name. Is it dBus pa blo gsal's misunderstanding to consider it the name of a Sūtra ? In the corresponding passages of GTCM and CKGT, such a Sūtra is not mentioned.

Thus [the Bodhisattva who accepts single consciousness] maintains.

[87 b 2] Such are the doctrinal positions of those who maintain six groups of consciousness (*rNam par śes pa tshogs drug du smra ba*, **Ṣaḍvijñānakāyavādin*) and those who maintain a single consciousness ([*rNam par śes pa tshogs*] *gcig du smra ba*, **Ekavijñānakāyavādin*).⁷²⁾

[3.3. Mental factors (*sems las byuñ ba, caitta*)]

[Regarding mental factors,] there are two opinions: that the mental factors are different from the mind and that they are not different [from it]. (k° XI- 8 ab)

[87 b 3] Regarding the mental factors which have been mentioned above,⁷³⁾ there are two opinions: that they are different from the mind and that they are not different [from it].

72) So far as the expression “*rnam śes tshogs gcig*” is concerned, we can find it for example in CKGT 202.6: *rnam śes tshogs gcig tu 'dod*. In BSGT, only three doctrinal positions are treated, namely the **Aṣṭavijñānakāyavādin*, the **Ṣaḍ°* and the **Eka°*. In CKGT (202.5 – 203.2, cf. Hakamaya (1976) 234, 249 – 251) and GTCM (*ñā* 78 a 6 ff.), more positions are explained: 1) **Eka-vijñānakāyavādin*: there are two kinds, those who maintain only *ālayavijñāna* and those who maintain only *mano-vijñāna*. 2) **Dvi°*: those who maintain *kliṣṭa-manas* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. 3) **Ṣaḍ°*: followers of the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti (*sDe bdun gyi rjes 'brañ gi sems tsam pa*). 4) **Sapta°*: those who maintain *ṣaḍ-pravṛtti-vijñāna* and *ādāna-vijñāna*. 5) **Aṣṭa°*: followers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Sa sde sogs las 'byuñ ba ltar gyi luñ gi rjes 'brañ gi sems tsam pa*). 6) **Nava°*: those who maintain *ṣaḍ-pravṛtti-vijñāna*, *ādāna-vijñāna*, *ālayavijñāna* and *amalavijñāna*. This is said to be the doctrinal position of Yañ dag bden pa (Paramārtha). The CKGT does not mention any source, but in the GTCM (*ñā* 78 b 7), the *rNam par śes pa'i mdzod* (=決定藏論 *Jue ding zang lun*, T. [30] (1584)) is mentioned. The *Jue ding zang lun* is a translation of the first part of the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahanī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but it is more than a translation; Paramārtha inserted some interpretations of his own inspiration. The *amalavijñāna* is one example (id. 1031 a). The *amala-vijñāna* is mentioned, by the way, in other works translated by him such as, a) *Zhuan shi lun* 轉識論 **Vijñānapariṇāmasāstra*, T. [31] (1587) 62 c; b) *Shi ba kong lun* 十八空論 **Aṣṭāśaśūnyatāśāstra*, T. [31] (1616) 863 b.

73) Cf. *supra* BSGT 85 a 4, 85 b 1 (?).

[3.3.1. Those who maintain that the mental factors are different from the mind]

[87 b 4] The first [opinion] is that of masters such as Ārya-Asaṅga. They [refute by the following four reasons those who maintain that the mental factors do not exist separately from the mind and that they are nothing but the states of it]⁷⁴⁾ : (i) If the mental factors did not exist substantially, the determination that the aggregates (*phun po, skandha*) are five would not be possible because sensation (*tshor ba, vedanā*) and notion (*'du šes, samjñā*) also would not exist substantially. (ii) Since there is no difference in the cause (*byed pa'i rgyu, kāraṇa*), it is not possible concerning the effect (*viz. mental factors*) [to say] that they are established substantially or are not established.⁷⁵⁾ (iii) If there is, in the mental factors, a difference (*khyad par, viśeṣa*) which is not similar to the mind, the [mental factors] could be established substantially [: therefore, the mental factors would be different from the mind]. If there is no difference, it is not possible [to consider the mental factors] even as the different states [of the mind : that is meaningless].⁷⁶⁾ (iv) It is in contradiction with what is said in

74) The following is a paraphrase of the YBh (D. (4038) *ži* 77 a 1 -b 7 ; P. [111] (5539) *zi* 80 b 2 -81 b 1 ; T. [30] (1579) lvi 609 a 3 -b 10), at the end of which our verse (BSGT 87 b 6 -88 a 1) is found as *bar dom (antarōddāna)*. In this part of the YBh concerning the *pañcaskandha*, the opinion of those (certain Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas) who maintain that the mental factors are nothing but the mind is refuted: *dge sbyon'i dan' bram ze la la min' la sems tsam žig rdzas su 'dod la sems las byun' ba'i chos rnams ni mi 'dod pa gañ dag yod pa de dag kyañ mi 'thad do // . . .*

75) The explanation of the second reason in BSGT is not very clear. In Ybh, the opinion that the mental factors are nothing but states of the mind is criticized, for the reason that there is no other primary cause because of which the states of the mind could change. Cf. YBh D. 77 a 5 -6, P. 80 b 7 -8 : *byed rgyu khyad par med pa'i phyir sems kyi gnas skabs gžan du 'gyur ba ni mi ruñ no // skad cig gcig la gañ gis gnas skabs gžan la ston par 'gyur ba'i byed rgyu khyad par can gžan ni mi dmigs te / de lta bas na gnas skabs kyi bye brag kyañ mi ruñ no //*.

76) Here also the opinion that the mental factors are nothing but states of the mind is refuted. Cf. YBh D. 77 a 2 -5, P. 80 b 2 -7.

a scriptural passage (*luñ, āgama*) :

“The mind is defiled by [a mental factor,] passion (*'dod chags, rāga*), and purified by [a mental factor,] faith (*dad pa, śraddhā*). ”⁷⁷⁾

Such is the refutation [by the master Ārya-Asaṅga and others]. It is said in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* [of the *Yogācārabhūmi*] :

“[The opinion that the mental factors are not different from the mind does not stand,] because the five [aggregates] would not be possible, because there is no difference [in] the cause, because there are faults [even if one considers the mental factors only as] the states of the [mind], and because it is in contradiction with scripture (*luñ, āgama*). ”⁷⁸⁾

[3.3.2. Those who maintain that the mental factors are not different from the mind]

[88 a 1] The second [opinion] is that of the Bodhisattva who maintains a single [consciousness] (*gCig pur smra ba'i byaṅ chub sems dpa'*),⁷⁹⁾ the master Dharmakīrti and others.

[88 a 1] [The Bodhisattva who maintains a single consciousness]⁷⁹⁾ maintains that [consciousness] proceeds alone, as is said in the *Brāhmaṇavarga* of the *Udānavarga*⁸⁰⁾ (XXXIII k°67[Tib.] = k°55[Skt.]) :

77) In YBh an *Āgama* is cited under a slightly different form, and the second part of our *Āgama* is not found there. Cf. YBh D. 77 a 7, P. 80 b 8 – 81 a 1 : *'dod chags kyi ñe bar ñon moṅs pa can du 'gyur ba dan / že sdañ dan / gti mug gis ñe bar ñon moṅs pa* (D. *ma*) *can du gyur pa'i sems ni rnam par grol bar mi 'gyur ro žes ji skad gsuṅs pa'o //*.

78) *bar sdom* (*antarōddāna*) in YBh D. 77 b 7, P. 81 b 8, T. 609 b 8 – 9. See also Mimaki (1982) n. 332.

79) The source for the combination of *gCig pur smra ba'i b°* and the *UV* is the *MSam* II 12 C and the *MSam-bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu. Cf. *supra* n. 69, n. 71. It is clear, judging from the wordorder, that our author cited this verse of the *UV* from the *MSam*.

80) Cf. Schmithausen (1970) 54 (also 55, 60, 98, 104) :

dūraṃga(ma)m ekacaram aśarīraṃ guhāśayam (✓)

damayati durddamaṃ cittam brāhmaṇam tam bravīmy aham / (✓)

Skt in YBh (Ms. 135 a 5 f., Chin. 386 a 20, Tib. P. *dzi* 298 b 8, D. *tshi* 256 b 3 – 4).

“I call a Brāhmaṇa one who will train the mind which, without a body, residing within, going far, proceeding alone, is difficult to train.”

[88 a 2] The master [Dharmakīrti] also holds the mind itself to be sensation (*tshor ba, vedanā*) in so far as it experiences (*ñams su myoñ ba, anubhava*),⁸¹⁾ to be notion (*'du śes, samjñā*) in so far as it apprehends the phenomenal marks (*mtshan mar 'dzin pa, nimittôdgrahaṇa*)⁸¹⁾ and to be volition (*sems pa, cetanā*) in so far as it moves toward the object (*yul la g-yo ba*). For it is said in [his] *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* (I 70. 23–25) :

“Because one sees that they are of the same nature, the *buddhi* (*blo*)⁸²⁾ on the one hand and the *anubhava* (*ñams su myoñ ba*)⁸²⁾ on the other hand are not different,”

and [in PVn I k°27 b–d = PV III k°279 b–d] :

“If [you, the Sāṃkhya, say that the [color,] white, and pain etc. which appear as different]⁸³⁾ are not different, and that the *buddhi* (*blo*)⁸²⁾ and the *vedanā* (*myoñ*)⁸²⁾ which appear without difference are different, what would the difference and the non–difference be based upon ? ”

81) Cf. — AK I k°14 cd : *vedanā 'nubhavaḥ samjñā nimittôdgrahaṇātmikā* // (Tib.) P. 35 a : *tshor ba myoñ ba 'du śes ni (/ /) mtshan mar 'dzin pa'i bdag ñid do* // ; — PrasP 343.9 (ad MM XVIII 1) : *rūpānubhava-nimittôdgrahaṇābhisamskaraṇa-viśaya-prativijñapti-lakṣaṇaḥ pañca skandhāḥ* / (Tib.) P. 128 a 1–2 : *phuñ po lña ni gzugs su ruñ ba dañ / ñams su myoñ ba dañ / mtshan mar 'dzin pa dañ / mñon par 'du byed pa dañ / yul so sor rnam par rig pa'i mtshan ñid can yin na* / . . .

82) In these citations from the PVn, at first glance it seems that the identification of the *buddhi* with the *anubhava/vedanā* (therefore that of the mind with the mental factors) is treated. But, in the PVn and the PV, it is the Sāṃkhya philosophy that is criticized at the end of the *svasamvedana* section. The *buddhi* is the non-intelligent element in the Sāṃkhya philosophy, and the *anubhava/vedanā* is the apprehension of *buddhi* by the unique intelligent element, *puruṣa*. Thus the *buddhi* and the *anubhava/vedanā* are distinguished in the Sāṃkhya philosophy, and that position is criticized.

83) *Pāda a* : *bhinnābhaḥ sita-duḥkhādir* / (Tib.) *dkar sdug la sogs tha dad snāñ*.

[88 a 4] Therefore this is what is said in the [*Mahāyāna*–]*sūtrā-lāṅkāra* (XI k° 34)⁸⁴⁾ :

“The mind is considered to appear as double (viz. cognizer and cognized). In the same way⁸⁵⁾ it is considered to appear as passion (*chags*, *rāga*) etc. and faith (*dad*, *śraddhā*) etc. There is no [factor other than it], either defiled or good.”

[3.4. Conditioning factors not associated [with the mind] (*mi ldan pa'i 'du byed*, *viprayukta-saṃskāra*)]

[88 a 5] Explaining the conditioning factors not associated [with the mind] (*mi ldan pa'i 'du byed*, *viprayukta-saṃskāra*)⁸⁶⁾ :

The conditioning factors not associated [with the mind], such as acquisition (*thob* [*pa*], *prāpti*), are designations for the three [categories] of matter (*gzugs*, *rūpa*) and the other [two].

(k° XI– 8 cd)

84) According to Sthiramati's commentary on this verse, this refers to those who maintain that the mental factors and the external objects do not exist apart from the mind; cf. ed. Hayashima (1978) 98: *Sems tsam su smra ba kha cig ni rnam par rig pa tsam ŷes bya bas sems tsam du zad kyi / sems las ma gtogs par sems las byuñ ba'i chos dan phyi'i yul mams med kyan med par 'dod do //*. But it is not certain that one could only interpret this verse in this manner.

85) *tad-vat*. Levi (1911): “l'ayant” (?), Thurman (1979): “having it” (?). Cf. Tib. *de bžin*.

86) We are not sure if there is any reason for the fact that our author omits the term *gzi* only after *mi ldan pa'i 'du byed*. He puts it after all the other four categories; ex. *gzugs kyi gzi*, etc. The situation is the same for the other chapters, viz. the Vaibhāṣika chapter (BSGT 65 a 5) and the Sautrāntika chapter (BSGT 79 a 2). As we shall see in the following passages, according to the Yogācāra, the *viprayukta-saṃskāras* are nothing but designations for states of matter, mind and mental factors. See the same kind of discussion in the Sautrāntika chapter; cf. Mimaki (1979) 201–202, (1980) 154–156.

[88 a 5] The conditioning factors not associated [with the mind] are designations for the states of [matter,]⁸⁷⁾ mind (*sems, citta*) and mental factors (*sems las byuñ ba, caitta*). Because matter (*gzugs, rūpa*) also does not exist apart from these two (viz. the mind and the mental factors), the [conditioning factors not associated with the mind] are, in reality, designations solely for the states of the mind and the mental factors.

[88 a 6] In this connection, when one accepts the receptacle-consciousness,⁸⁸⁾ [1] acquisition (*thob pa, prāpti*) is the state in which the good or other potential power (*nus pa, śakti*) is acquired in the receptacle-consciousness. [2] Non-acquisition (*ma thob pa, aprāpti*) is the state in which the [potential power] is lost. [3] Homogeneity (*skal ba mñam pa, sabhāgatā*) is the state in which the bodies and so forth of beings are homogeneous. [4, 5, 6] Unconsciousness (*'du śes med pa, āsamjñika*) and the two absorptions (*sñoms 'jug, samāpatti*) [viz. the absorption of unconsciousness (*'du śes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa, asaṃjñisamāpatti*) and the absorption of cessation (*'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa, nirodhasamāpatti*)] are the states in which mind and the mental factors do not appear. [7] The vital faculty (*srog gi dbaṅ po, jīvitēndriya*) is the state in which a being persists, having the homogeneity of its kind (*ris mthun, nikāya-sabhāga*). [8, 9, 10, 11] The four characters (*mtshan ñid, lakṣaṇa*) are designations for the states of a series: production (*skye ba, jāti*) [is a designation] for the state in which matter, the mind and the mental factors have newly arisen; duration (*gnas pa, sthiti*) [is a designation] for the state in which

87) According to the context, it would be better if we had *gzugs dan* before *sems dan* . . . Cf. *infra* BSGT 88 b 2. One might argue that matter (*gzugs*) is not necessary here because this is the Vijñānavādin chapter. But in the preceding verse (BSGT XI- 8 cd) itself we already have *gzugs sogs gsum*.

88) It seems strange that the case in which one does not accept the receptacle-consciousness is not explained in this treatise.

[matter and so forth] are born in a homogeneous series; aging (*rga ba, jarā*) [is a designation] for the state in which they have arisen in a non-homogeneous series; impermanence (*mi rtag pa, anityatā*) [is a designation] for the state in which they have arisen without remaining later. [12, 13, 14] [According to the *Satyākāravādin (rNam bden pa)]⁸⁹⁾ the designation as three collections (*tshogs, kāya*) is used for the state in which the mental consciousness (*yid kyi śes pa, mano-vijñāna*) appears as words (*min, nāma*), phrases (*tshig, pada*) and syllables (*yi ge, vyañjana*). According to the *Alīkākāravādin (rNam rdzun pa), it is the state in which the series of word-universals (*sgra spyi'i phren ba*)⁹⁰⁾ appears as these three.

[3.5. Intermediate stanza (*bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa, antaraśloka*)]

Thus, because the four [categories] are conditioned (*'dus byas, saṃskṛta*), how causes, conditions and effects [function] is on the whole as [explained] before.⁹¹⁾ Concerning the causal relation, there are two [possibilities], simultaneous and non-simultaneous. (AŚ XI-1)

This is an intermediate stanza (*bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa, antara-śloka*).⁹²⁾

89) Cf. BRGT of 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzañ, *rtsa ba* 17 a 6 (=p.110) : *tshogs gsum rNam bden ltar na ni // yid śes min tshig yi ger snañ // rNam rdzun ltar na sgra spyi yi // phren ba gsum du snañ ba yin //*.

90) The present translator is for the moment incapable of explaining why the designation as three collections is the appearance of the mental consciousness for the rNam bden pa, and that of the series of word-universals for the rNam rdzun pa.

91) Cf. BSGT 68 a 5 – 69 b 5 (Vaibhāṣika chapter).

92) Concerning the *antaraśloka*, see Vetter (1966) 7, Mimaki (1980 a), Dreyfus & Lindtner (1989) n. 38, Fukuda (1989) n. 25.

[3.6. The unconditioned ('*dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*)⁹³⁾]

[88 b 4] Explaining the category of the unconditioned ('*dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*) :

The four unconditioned [factors are] empty space (*nam mkha', ākāśa*), two cessations ('*gog pa, nirodha*) and Thusness (*de bzin ñid, tathatā*). (k° XI-9 ab)

One should supply the copula [in this verse]. One calls unconditioned ('*dus ma byas pa, asaṃskṛta*) a thing (*chos, dharma*) in which there is neither production nor destruction.

[88 b 5] The [unconditioned factors] are of four kinds. Among them, empty space is the mere absence of a resistant tangible thing (*thogs par byed pa'i reg bya, pratigha-spraṣṭavya*). Cessation without intelligence⁹⁴⁾ (*so sor ma brtags par 'gog pa, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*) is simply [the state in which] the conditioned is not produced because of the incompleteness of conditions. Cessation with intelligence⁹⁴⁾ (*so sor brtags pa'i 'gog pa, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*) is simply [the state in which] by means of antidotes (*gñen po, pratipakṣa*) impure latent seeds are exhausted in the receptacle-consciousness. This is Thusness (*de bzin ñid, tathatā*) or the Perfect [Nature] (*yoñis su grub pa, pariniṣpanna*), which is pure by nature and free from adventitious defilements (*glo bur gyi dri ma, āgantuka-mala*).⁹⁵⁾ Thusness (*de bzin ñid, tathatā*) is the Perfect [Nature] without change

93) Concerning the unconditioned, see a detailed study in Bareau (1951).

94) pratisaṃkhyā=prajñāviśeṣa. Cf. AKBh 4.1-2 (ad AK I k° 6) : *duḥkhādīnām ārya-satyānām pratisaṃkhyānam pratisaṃkhyā prajñāviśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaḥ* / (Tib.). P. 29 b 5-6 : *sdug bsñal la sogs pa 'phags pa'i bden pa mams la so sor rtog pa ni so sor brtags pa ste śes rab kyi bye brag go // des thob par bya ba'i 'gog pa ni so sor brtags pas 'gog pa'o //*.

95) This passage is a continuation of the explanation of the third *asaṃskṛta*. The explanation of the fourth *asaṃskṛta*, Thusness, begins in the next passage.

(*'gyur ba med pa'i yoñs su grub pa, nirvikāra-pariniṣpatti*)⁹⁶⁾ which does not have the characteristics of a Self and things (*chos, dharma*).

[3.7. The relation between the five categories and the aggregates, sense-fields and elements]⁹⁷⁾

[89 a 1] Showing the five categories which are knowable as aggregates and so forth :

Three and a half, or one and a half, or seven and a half are the aggregates and so forth that are reals (*rdzas, dravyasat*).

(k° XI-9 cd)


[89 a 2] The conditioned factors (*'dus byas, saṃskṛta*) can belong (*'gyur*) to all three rubrics (*chos gsum*) [: i.e., the aggregates, the sense-

96) Cf. MAnV III k°11: *artha-prāpti-prapattyā hi paramārthas tridhā mataḥ / nirvikārāvi-paryāsa-pariniṣpattito dvayam //* (Tib.) *don dan thob dan sgrub pa ni // don dam rnam pa gsum du 'dod // 'gyur med phyin ci ma log pa // yoñs su grub pa rnam pa gñis //*.

And according to the *MAnVBh* we can establish the following schema :

artha-paramārtha=tathatā ————— asaṃskṛta — nirvikāra-pariniṣpatti
 prāpti-paramārtha=nirvāṇa —————
 pratipatti-paramārtha=mārga ————— saṃskṛta — aviparyāsa-pariniṣpatti

97) In order to facilitate the understanding of the following passages, here is a table of concordances concerning these items :



fields and the elements], whereas the unconditioned (*'dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*) will belong (*'gyur*) to [the last of the eighteen] elements (*kḥams, dhātu*) and [the last of the twelve] sense-fields (*skye mched, āyatana*).

[89 a 2] So far as the aggregates (*phuñ po, skandha*) are concerned, three and a half [of the five aggregates] exist as reals (*rdzas, dravya-sat*), namely, the aggregates of sensation (*tshor ba, vedanā*), notion (*'dus śes, saṃjñā*), conditioning factors (*'du byed, saṃskāra*) that are mental factors (*sems las byun ba, caitta*),⁹⁸⁾ and consciousness (*rnam par śes pa, vijñāna*).

[89 a 3] So far as the sense-fields are concerned, one and a half [of the twelve sense-fields] exist as reals, namely, the sense-fields of the mind (*yid kyi skye mched, mana-āyatana*) and the mental [factors] which constitute a part of the sense-fields of the objects-of-thought (*chos kyi skye mched, dharmāyatana*).

[89 a 3] So far as the elements are concerned, seven and a half exist as reals, namely, the seven mind-elements (*sems kyi kḥams, citta-dhātu*) and the mental [factors] which constitute a part of the element of the objects-of-thought (*chos kyi kḥams, dharma-dhātu*).

[89 a 4] According to [those who maintain] that the mind and the mental factors are not different, the aggregate of consciousness (*rnam par śes pa'i phuñ po, vijñāna-skandha*) alone, or the sense-field of the mind (*yid kyi skye mched, mana-āyatana*) alone, or the seven mind-elements (*sems kyi kḥams, citta-dhātu*) alone exist as real. The way the aggregates, sense-fields and elements which consist of matter do not exist as reals was already explained [when I mentioned above how] matter does not exist as a real.⁹⁹⁾

98) The *viprayukta-saṃskāras* are denied substantial reality in the Yogācāra system, as was shown above in the section [3.4].

99) Cf. *supra* Section [3.1] = BSGT 85 a 4 - b 1.

[3.8. The relation between the five categories and the Four Noble Truths]

These [five categories] are included within the Truths of Suffering, of Origin, of Cessation and of Path. (k° XI- 10 ab)

[89 a 5] These categories are included within the Four Truths. Among them, the aggregates of appropriation (*ñe bar len pa'i phuñ po, upādāna-skandha*) in the resultant aspect, included within the beings which are born and the birth-places where they are born, and which are suffering each in their own way (*ci rigs par, yathāyogam*) the three sufferings (*sdug bsñal gsum, tri-duḥkhatā*),¹⁰⁰ are the Truth of Suffering (*sdug bsñal gyi bden pa, duḥkha-satya*). The aggregates of appropriation in the causal aspect, namely, the acts associated with impurity (*zag pa dan bcas pa'i las, sāsraṇa-karman*) are the Truth of Origin (*kun 'byuñ gi bden pa, samudaya-satya*). Cessation with intelligence and Thusness are the Truth of Cessation (*'gog pa'i bden pa, nirodha-satya*): this is the obtained result. The [five] aggregates without impurity (*zag pa med pa'i phuñ po, anāsraṇa-skandha*)¹⁰¹ which lead to Nirvāṇa (*mya ñan las 'das pa*) are the Truth of Path (*lam gyi bden pa, mārga-satya*). Empty space and cessation without intelligence are not included within the Four Truths.

(To be continued)

100) Viz. 1) *duḥkha-duḥkhatā* (suffering of pain), 2) *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* (suffering of formations), 3) *vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā* (suffering of change). Cf. AKBh ad AK VI k° 3. See above all L. Schmithausen, Zur buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leidhaftigkeit, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Supplement III. 2, pp. 918 – 931.

101) *Anāsraṇāḥ pañca-skandhāḥ* = 1) *śīla*, 2) *saṃādhi*, 3) *prajñā*, 4) *vimukti*, and 5) *vimukti-jñāna-darśana*. Cf. AKBh 17.24 – 18.1; (Tib.) P. 41 b 4 – 5.

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- AK : *Abhidharmakośa(kārikā)* of Vasubandhu, ed. with AKBh.
- AKBh : *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu. In : P. Pradhan (ed.), *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8, Patna, 1967.
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P: Peking edition.

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PSGT: *Grub mtha' rnam gzag* of Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa. Ed. sBag sa (20 folios).

PV: *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti.

PVBh: *Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya* of Prajñākaragupta. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkārah of Prajñākaragupta*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1, Patna, 1953.

PVn: *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti.

PVV: *Pramāṇavārttika-vṛtti* of Manorathanandin. D. Shastri (ed.), *Pramāṇavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrti*, with the commentary “vṛtti” of Āchārya Manorathanandin, Varanasi, 1968.

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